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Abstract 
Alliances play a central role in international relations theory. However, aside from ap­
plications of traditional cooperative game theory that ignore the issue of enforcement in 
anarchic systems, or interpretations of the repeated Prisoners' Dilemma in the attempt 
to understand the source of cooperation in such systems, we have little theory on which 
to base predictions about alliance formation. This essay, then, builds on an n-country, 
non-cooperative, game-theoretic model of conflict in anarchic systems in order to furnish 
a theoretical basis for such predictions. Defining an alliance as a collection of countries 
that jointly abide by "collective security strategies" with respect to each other but not 
with respect to members outside of the alliance, we establish the necessary and sufficient 
conditions for an alliance system to be stable. In addition, we show that not all winning 
or minimal winning coalitions can form alliances, that alliances among smaller states can 
be stable, that bipolar alliance structures do not exhaust the set of stable structures, and 
that only specific countries can play the role of balancer. 
*This research was supported by the NSF Grant SES-8822308 to Duke University and
the NSF Grant SES-8922262 to the California Institute of Technology. 
Alliances in Anarchic International Systems 
There is little disagreement over the proposition that the concept of alliance is 
central to international relations theory. In the realist view, "the historically most 
important manifestation of the balance of power . . .  is to be found . . .  in the relations 
between one nation or alliance and another alliance" (Morgenthau 1 959:1 69) because 
"alliances and regional coalitions among the weak to defend themselves from the 
strong have been the typical_Jllethod for preserving ... balance" (Wright 1 965:773 ). 
And although neoliberals offers an alternative formula for stability, alliances in the 
form of regimes play an important role there as weII to the extent that they facilitate 
the realization of mutually beneficial economic gains. 
Insofar as our understanding of aIIiances is concerned, we are aided by the fact 
that definitions come within striking distance of acceptability by even rigorous 
theoretical standards. Consider Walt's ( 1987: 12)  definition: "an alliance is a formal or 
informal arrangement for security cooperation between two or more sovereign states;" 
or Snyder's ( I  990: 1 04 ): "alliances ... are formal associations of states for the use (or 
non-use) of military force, intended for either the security or the aggrandizement of 
their members, against specific other states ... " Although we might expand the domain 
of agreements to include economic cooperation, an alliance here matches the game­
theorist's idea of a coalition in which people coordinate strategies to realize some 
outcome that cannot be realized through uncoordinated action. 
However, definitions do not tell us how alliances are formed and maintained in 
anarchic systems nor do they provide predictions about their formation. To that end, 
we turn to a game-theoretic model that specifies the circumstances under which such 
systems are and are not stable. Of course, ours is not the first attempt to apply game 
theory to such matters. Beginning with Riker's ( 1962) "size principle," continuing 
through the analysis of public goods (Olson and Zeckhauser 1 966, Oppenheimer 1 979), 
and extending to the application of cooperative solution theory (Niou, et al 1 989), 
many hypotheses have been offered about aIIiance formation. But these analyses do 
not directly confront the fact that alliances arise in environments in which there are 
no exogenous mechanisms for enforcing agreements. Applications of cooperative 
game theory and derivative hypotheses such as the size principle assume away the 
issue of enforceability and analyses that appeal to some feature of public goods focus 
on a different issue -- burden sharing -- than the one we wish to address here. And 
even that research that explicitly explores the sources of cooperation in anarchic 
environments relies on a particular game, the repeated Prisoners' dilemma, which 
cannot generally characterize international affairs whenever those affairs become 
purely conflictual (c.f., Taylor 1 976, 1987; Bendor and Mookherjee 1 987). 
The question we try to answer here then is: If alliances arise and are sustained 
purely on the basis of individual self-interest in an otherwise anarchic world in which 
there is competition for scarce resources, what types of alliance structures are stable 
and what types are unstable? We begin in Section 1 by reviewing a model of anarchic 
systems developed previously (Niou and Ordeshook 1 990, 1 99 1 )  to formalize the 
notions of balance of power and collective security and to establish the possibility of 
systems that are stable in the sense that all countries can ensure their sovereignty 
against all threats. Here, however, we focus on the alliances that might form in 
anticipation of the necessity for conducting international politics in an otherwise 
anarchic world. In Section 2 we define alliances by equating them with limited 
collective security agreements, and in Section 3 we define stable alliance systems. In 
Section 4 we provide a necessary and sufficient condition for such systems to exist, 
and we offer some examples and subsidiary results that allow us to interpret those 
conditions. We also examine the following questions: Are profitable alliances 
restricted to winning or minimal winning coalitions? Can the largest (most militarily 
powerful) states form an alliance at the expense of smaller states, or will alliance 
structures necessarily divide the most powerful states into opposing camps -- is there 
any inherent tendency towards bipolarity? Must a collective security equilibrium 
encompass all states or can a subset of states enforce a system devoid of threats against 
sovereignty. Can alliances be purely defensive? Are offensive alliances more 
attractive than defensive ones? Finally, in Section 5 we examine the role in our model 
of balancing powers and in Section 6 we provide some concluding remarks. Appendix 
A offers some results under an alternative assumption about the actions of indifferent 
countries, and Appendix B contains the proofs of all results. 
1 .  Balance of Power versus Collective Security 
Much of the realist-neoliberal debate can be interpreted as an argument over 
whether a balance of power or a collective security equilibrium is more stable or is a 
more appropriate characterization of contemporary affairs (Niou and Ordeshook 
1 99 1 ). However, the resolution of this debate requires two things -- a model of 
anarchic systems and formulations of balance of power and collective security in terms 
of the strategies that countries employ. 
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A Model: Recognizing the heroic simplification implied by such an assumption, 
we begin with the supposition that, conditional on maintaining their sovereignty, 
countries pursue a single transferable resource in constant supply. Next, we suppose 
that the amount of that resource controlled by each country is the sole determinant of 
winning and losing coalitions, and that countries join coalitions because it is in their 
individual interest to do so. Finally, in accordance with Boulding's (1968: 1 05) view 
that "threat systems are the basis of politics," we assume that threats and counter­
threats are the mechanisms whereby countries secure resources from each other. 
To formalize matters, we let r0 = (r01, r02, ••• ,r0n) be the initial distribution of 
resources across a set S = { 1 ,2, ... ,n) of n countries, where r01 � r02 � ... � r0n. Next, 
we let r( C) denote the total resources controlled by the subset of countries C, and R 
= r(S) be the total resources in the system. Hence, C is a winning coalition if r(C) > 
R/2, it is losing if r( C) < R/2, and a winning coalition is minimal winning if the 
deletion of any member from it renders it losing. Countries who are in at least one 
minimal winning coalition are essential; otherwise they are inessential. If r0i > R/2, 
country i is predominant -- it is winning against all other countries and it can absorb 
their resources at will. Hence, every country has an incentive to avoid the 
predominance of any other country. If r0i = R/2, then i is near-predominant. 
A voiding mathematical niceties, the game we use to model anarchic systems can then 
be described as follows: 
I. A randomly chosen country, i, is given the opportunity to offer an initial 
threat or to "pass." An initial threat is a new resource distribution r and an 
implied threatening coalition C that corresponds to the countries who do not 
lose resources by moving from r0 to r. Of course, r(C) > r(S-C). 
2. If  i passes, we return to step I.
3. If i threatens, its partners in C decide whether to accept participation in the
threat. Only if all partners accept does i's threat call for a response by the
threatened countries. If one or more members of C reject, we return to I.
4. Responses by threatened countries are of two types. First, each threatened
country, taken in some random sequence, can offer a counter-threat, which
is a new threat. If this counter is accepted unanimously by the newly
proposed coalition, it cancels the original threat by becoming the new current
threat, and requires a response by the newly threatened countries.
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5. A second type of response is a proposal by one or more threatened countries
to surrender resources to one or more members of the threatening coalition.
If a transfer is accepted by everyone involved, it determines a new status quo,
and the game proceeds as before by returning to step I.
6. Any threat that is not successfully countered is implemented -- the threatened
resource distribution becomes the new status quo, and the game proceeds as
before by returning to step I.
This model does not consider the costs of conflict, uncertainty, and exogenous 
resource growth; and it characterizes anarchy in a highly structured way. Also, by 
supposing that countries maximize a resource that is in constant supply, it may be 
biased in favor of the realist argument. However, whatever cooperation emerges in 
it does not emerge merely because we have made cooperation sufficiently profitable 
via some assumption about the value of public goods. Also, it assumes that countries 
join and maintain coalitions because it is in their individual interest to do so and not 
because exogenously imposed constraints. And it matches Boulding's view of threat 
systems as the fundamental characteristic of anarchic politics. 
Strategies: The essential difference between a system governed by a balance of 
power and one governed by collective security concerns the strategies that countries 
employ. Briefly, a strategy is a plan of action that specifies three things. First, it tells 
the country what to do whenever there is no current threat and when nature gives it 
the opportunity to threaten or to pass. Second, for each threat in which it is included 
in the threatening coalition, a strategy tells it whether to accept or reject that threat. 
Finally, for each threat against the country, a strategy tells that country what counter 
to use and whether or not to accept a counter that is offered. 
There are a great many alternative strategies for a game as complex as ours. 
However, we distinguish between balance of power and collective security systems by 
focusing on two particular types of strategies. 
Definition: In a "balance of power system," all countries use stationary 
strategies -- strategies in which each country makes the same choices 
whenever it encounters the same threat, so that countries ignore who made a 
threat or who agreed to participate in it when fashioning their respopnse. 
Hence, in a balance of power system, "all states are potentially fit alliance partners; 
none is seen as much more evil than any other" (Jervis 1 986:60). Alternatively, 
4 
Definition: In a "collective security system," all countries use punishment 
strategies, where punishments are directed against those who try to upset the 
status quo by making a threat or by agreeing to participate in one. 
Strategies in a collective security system, then, are not stationary because they posit 
specific threats, depending on who defects from some prior agreement. 
Equilibria: Throughout our analysis we employ the concept of an equilibrium most 
appropriate to our model -- subgame perfect equilibria. Thus, cooperation is 
enforced by individual self-interest, where that self-interest is defined by the 
strategies of other states. Briefly, now, if we find equilibria supported by stationary 
strategies and if we learn also that only countries controlling some critical relative 
resource level can ensure their sovereignty, then countries must be vigilant about 
relative gains and losses. On the other hand, if there is an equilibrium supported by 
punishment strategies in which no country offers an initial threat, then realization of 
this equilibrium renders the issue of sovereignty and relative position less salient and 
allows for greater flexibility in the design of cooperative arrangements. Moreover, 
if the benefits that accrue through free trade and the like require a non-conflictual 
world, and if these benefits disappear when agreements to achieve them are disrupted 
by competition over relative position, then the issue which bears directly on the 
realist-neoliberal debate is whether such an equilibrium is more or less attractive than 
the one supported by stationary strategies. 
Skirting formalism, we need only review our two central conclusions.1 First, if
we further characterize stationary strategies by the statement "countries participate in 
threats if doing so does not lead to a reduction in their resources," then:2
Result 1: If all countries are essential, and if they all abide by stationary 
strategies, then there exists a strong equilibrium in which no country is 
eliminated. But if we allow sequential threats (i.e., i proposes that C threatens 
j, then k, etc.), then inessential countries and perhaps even "small" essential 
ones cannot assure their sovereignty (Niou and Ordeshook, 1 990). 
Thus, there is an equilibrium in which the sovereignty of "larger" states, but not 
of smaller ones, is assured, in which case countries must be vigilant about their 
relative share of resources. With respect to this equilibrium's attractiveness, in 
addition to being self-enforcing, it is strong in this sense: The "largest" countries, if 
allowed to make a threat, do so because they gain and thereby avoid the possibility of 
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loss, whereas smaller countries, although unable to gain by participating in a threat, 
avoid the possibility of losses by doing so. So if a country believes that all others will 
abide by their equilibrium strategies, then it has a positive incentive to make or to 
agree to threats that include it in the threatening coalition, since not doing so 
diminishes its utility. 
To model collective security, we let D denote the countries that are the potential 
targets of punishments, and we consider a punishment strategy that matches the 
simplicity of stationary strategies, because we do not want to confront the objection 
that one type of equilibrium is easier to compute and realize than another. Hence, we 
restrict our attention to the following characterization: (a) No country proposes an 
initial threat; (b) No country accepts an initial threat if one is offered; (c) Threats are 
directed against one or more defectors; (d) Countries accept threats that are 
punishments; (e) Whenever any threat that is not part of a punishment is accepted, all 
countries use stationary strategies thereafter. Assuming that players defecting from 
(a)-(d) are added to D and are thereafter subject to punishment, we have the 
following result: 
Result 2: If there are four or more essential countries, the strategy described 
in (a)-( e) yields a strong equilibrium such that no country makes an initial 
threat and the status quo is preserved; but if there are only three such countries 
or if countries must sequentially reject their participation in threats, then the 
collective security equilibrium is not strong (Niou and Ordeshook 1991 ). 
Thus, punishment strategies support equilibria in which no one makes a threat, and 
no one is eliminated. But (and here we ought to keep in mind the bias in our model 
in favor of the realist conceptualization), such equilibria are vulnerable in that they 
are weak if there are only three essential countries or if countries must sequentially 
reveal their willingness to participate in threats. The particular problem occasioned 
by that weakness is that countries can "wander away" from the equilibrium. And 
because it is difficult to judge adherence to a punishment strategy (since commitment 
is revealed only after the fact), countries can not be certain beforehand that they are 
in fact in such an equilibrium. If all countries presume that all others have some 
chance of defecting from administering punishments -- if countries "play with a 
shaky hand" -- then the collective security equilibrium can break down. Thus, 
collective security requires "nurturing" by mechanisms that facilitate the realization 
6 
of those mutual benefits that disappear when countries compete for relative position 
rather than pursue the pure objective of absolute resource maximization. 
2. Threats and Alliances
The preceding analysis considers only two extremes -- either all states agree not
to threaten anyone and to punish defectors or all states stand ready to threaten anyone. 
However, although we equate one idea with collective security and the other with 
balance of power, balance of power systems are in fact commonly associated with an 
intermediate possibility in which subsets of states establish alliances whereby members 
of an alliance agree not to threaten each other but to threaten or defend against those 
outside of the alliance. Thus, to fully understand the sources of stability and 
instability, we must consider the concept of an alliance. 
In defining an alliance within the framework of our model, we can secure some 
guidance from recent history. Specifically, consider that throughout the Cold War the 
Warsaw Pact was held together not only by a set of economic relationships and by fear 
of invasion from the West, but also by military force. Defectors from the alliance -­
Hungary, Czechoslovakia, and Romania -- were, until recently, punished by the 
alliance's remaining members. And although nothing as dramatic as tanks rolling 
through Paris, Tokyo, or Bonn cemented the Western alliance, the source of its 
durability was, in addition to the threat from Moscow, its economic profitability. The 
collective security arrangement among the United States, Japan, and Western Europe 
required the administration of no severe military punishment, but there has always 
existed the threat of economic reprisal and a withdrawal of military support in the 
event of any defection. Similarly, if we take liberties with the notion of a regime, 
then we see that alliances are also collective security arrangements held together by 
the promise of gain and the threat of punishment: "A hegemon may help to create 
shared interests by providing rewards for cooperation and punishments for defection, 
but where no hegemon exists, similar rewards and punishments can be provided if 
conditions are favorable" (Keohane 1 984:78). Thus, regardless of whether we deem 
alliances as primarily defensive or offensive, the following definition seems 
appropriate: 
Definition: An alliance is a collective security arrangement among states in 
which all members of the alliance agree to not threaten each other, to punish 
defectors from this agreement whenever possible, and to threaten countries 
outside of the alliance whenever it is in their individual interest to do so. 
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Whether certain types of alliances act to preserve the status quo whereas others 
seek to upset it by making threats is an issue we address later. However, to ascertain 
whether this definition provides any leverage over our understanding of events, we 
must return to the method whereby we establish a balance of power and a collective 
security equilibrium. Briefly, the feature of our model that warrants emphasis is that 
it allows for the possibility that threats and counters, as well as resource reallocations, 
cohtinue in sequence forever. Thus, Wagner (I 986:55 1 )  outlines our game's correct 
treatment: "the basic question that concerns us is whether states will act so as to 
eliminate other states. If one state is eliminated from a four-actor game, for example, 
the result is to precipitate a three-actor game. If a value can be assigned to such a 
subgame for each player, it is possible to determine whether any players have an 
incentive to eliminate other players." We proceed, then, by pretending that the game 
is finite and that we know the consequences of all branches in its extensive form. 
After postulating these consequences, an equilibrium is characterized by strategies in 
which no one has an incentive to defect unilaterally to any choice not dictated by that 
strategy, and the postulated consequences are consistent in that they are "self-fulfilling 
prophesies" -- the choices they imply yield those consequences. 
We associate consequences with actions by forming a 2-way classification of 
coalitions, where members of one class can make threats that yield one type of 
consequence (the largest country in the threatening coalition becomes near­
predominant and no one in the coalition loses resources) and members of the other 
class can only make threats that can be countered by a coalition of the first type such 
that no threatening country is assured of gaining resources and some lose. 
Specifically, 
Definition: The set of winning coalitions C* is advantaged if 
i for every C E C*, the members of S-C have sufficient resources to 
render the largest member of C near-predominant; 
11 for every C E C* there is no other winning coalition C such that the 
intersection of C and C is the largest country in C but not in C. 
11i. no two coalitions in C* have a unique common largest member;3
iv C* is maximal in the sense that no additional coalitions satisfying 
conditions i and ii can be added without violating iii. 
We then define a primary threat as a resource vector r proposed by a member C of C* 
such that no member of C loses resources in r (ri 2:. rt for all i E C), the members of 
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S-C are threatened with elimination (ri = 0 for all i E S-C), and the threat promises 
to make the largest member of C near-predominant (ri = R/2 for i = max(C]). 
The critical components of our definition are ii and iii. Condition ii ensures that 
there cannot be a counter-threat that makes the same promise to a smaller country in 
C without simultaneously requiring the inclusion of some other members of C. 
Because these other members of C cannot simultaneously receive the same promise (it 
is always cheaper for a threatened coalition to transfer to resources to a single country 
if a transfer is their only way to disrupt a threat), these members will reject the 
counter in favor of the current threat. Conditions iii, in combination with ii, ensures 
that if a primary threat is made and accepted, there is no other threat that can serve 
as a counter to it and some or all of the threatened countries must cede resources to 
the largest threatening country. On the other hand, if a non-primary threat is made 
and accepted, then each (essential) threatened country can counter with a primary 
threat that is accepted. Hence, 
Remark 1: Whether or not countries abide by punishment or stationary 
strategies. if everyone is essential, no one makes a non-primary threat. And if 
all countries abide by stationary strategies and if a country proposes an initial 
threat, then it is a primary threat. and the final outcome has the largest 
threatening country becoming near-predominant at the expense of the initially 
threatened countries. 
To illustrate C* for specific initial resource distributions, consider the following 3, 4, 
and 5-country examples. 
Example: If r0 = (120,100,80), then C* = {{1,3), (2,3)) and primary threats take 
the form (150,0,150) and (0,150,150). The winning coalition (1,2) is not 
advantaged, because, in violation if condition ii, for C' = (2,3), C' n C = {2) 
= max[C'] * C. The set C* is unique for any 3-country game in which every 
country has less than one half of the system's resources. Moreover, the final 
outcome has country 1 becoming near-predominant at the expense of country 
2, or vise versa, with country 3 neither gaining nor losing resources. 
Example: If r0 = (100,95,75,30), country 4 is inessential, and C* is the same 
as before. If countries 1 or 2 make the initial threat, then either 1 and 4 
transfer to 2 or 2 and 4 transfer to l ;  but if 3 makes the initial threat, then a 
threat such as (I  10,105,85,0) eliminates 4. 
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Example: If r0 = ( 1 10,80,60, 50), everyone is essential and C* = ((1,2,3),
(1,2,4), (1,3,4), (2,3,4}}.4 Notice that (1,2) is not a member of C* since, in 
violation of condition ii, (2,3,4) is winning; nor is (1,3} a member of C* since, 
in violation of condition iii, (1,2,4} is winning and r((2,3,4}) > r((l ,3}). Like 
the 3-country case, only countries 1 and 2 can gain resources; but unlike the 
3-country case, countries 3 and 4 can lose resources if they are the target of 
an initial primary threat. 
Example: If r0 = ( 70,65,60, 55, 50), then C* = ((1,4, 5), (1,3,4), (1,3, 5}, (2,3,4},
(2,3,5}, (2,4, 5), (3 ,4, 5}}. Moreover, since country 3 can be the largest member 
of a minimal winning coalition, it, in addition to I and 2, can gain resources 
if it participates in an appropriate initial threat. 
Example: If r0 = (95,85,60,40,20), then C* = ((1,2,3), {1,2,4, 5}, {1,3,4}, {l ,3 ,5),
{l  ,3,4, 5), {2,3,4}, {2,3, 5), (2,3,4, 5}}. C* does not include { 1,4,5) because 
r((l ,2,3}) > r({l ,4, 5}); nor is {1,3} included because r((l ,2,4 , 5}) > r((l ,3}). 
An important lesson of these examples is that C* does not exhaust the set of 
minimal winning coalitions. For example, in the 3-country case the minimal winning 
coalition C = {1,2) is not included in C*. However, to characterize advantaged 
coalitions further, let the set L0 denote the smallest countries that can never be the 
largest member of a minimal winning coalition and let L = S-L0•5 In our 4- and in 
our first 5-country examples L0 = (3,4}; in our last example, L0 = (3,4,5}. The 
following remark summarizes what we know about advantaged coalitions (parts 1 and 
2 follow directly from definitions, whereas parts 3-5 are contained in the proofs we 
offer elsewhere of our previously stated results about equilibria): 
Remark 2: (I) Not all winning or minimal winning coalitions are advantaged; 
( 2) Every C in C'* must contain at least one member of Land one member of 
L0; ( 3) A coalition consisting of any one country in L and all of L0 is 
advantaged: ( 4) Every essential country is a member of some C in C*; ( 5) If 
there are 3 or more essential countries. then only coalitions with 3 or more 
members are advantaged. 
To this list we can add one more fact. Notice that in our 3-country example, 
country 3 cannot be the target of a primary threat. On the other hand, every country 
is the target of such a threat in our other examples. Lemma I generalizes this fact: 
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Lemma 1: If there are four or more essential countries, then every country is 
excluded from at least one coalition inc•. 
3. Stable Alliance Structures: A Definition
Thus far we have merely identified the coalitions that assure a beneficial resource
transfer, but we cannot determine what agreements can be reached in anticipation of 
playing our threat-counter-threat game. For example, is an all-encompassing 
collective security arrangement required forestall the possibility of threats; and are 
only alliances that correspond to advantaged coalitions profitable? Suppose, then, that 
prior to playing our threat-counter-threat game, countries bargain to partition 
themselves into exhaustive and disjoint alliances. We appreciate, of course, that such 
bargaining lies at the heart of the most interesting processes in international affairs. 
Indeed, we conjecture later that the period 187 1 - 19 14 consisted of just such an "out 
of equilibrium" process and, therefore, that "balance of power politics" does not 
correspond to the attainment of an equilibrium but rather to the process whereby a 
particular equilibrium is achieved. 
However, rather than model bargaining itself, we proceed using a classical 
cooperative game theoretic approach -- by identifying the potential "sticking points" 
of bargains. In accordance with our view that international systems are anarchic, 
though, we continue to assume that countries participate in alliances because it is in 
their individual interest to do so, and not because of any exogenous enforcement. 
Thus, a partition is a stable alliance structure if no set of countries can gain by 
coordinating their actions so as to reform the partition into a different alliance 
structure, either by defecting from their current alliances or by joining two or more 
alliances into a single alliance. 
To remove any ambiguity from this definition, let P be a partition of S. Next, 
define st as country i's security value with respect to P. Briefly,
Definition: country i's security value with respect to the partition P, st,
corresponds to i's minimum payoff if everyone subsequently abides by 
subgame perfect strategies, with the assumption that alliance partners play 
punishment strategies with respect to each other unless, in playing our threat­
counter-threat game, they prefer to defect unilaterally from doing so. 
This definition of security value is incomplete because we have some flexibility 
in the specification of certain actions when countries are indifferent. But before we 
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examine alternatives, let us consider a situation that entails no ambiguity. If no 
alliances form in our 3-country example -- if P = (( l} ,{2),{3)) -- then s/ = s/ = 70,
because neither 1 nor 2 can preclude the possibility that one or the other will join with 
3. But s/ = 80, because there is no primary threat against 3 and it can always offer
a primary threat as a counter to any threat against it. Indeed, since we already know 
that 3-country systems are unique in that country 3 cannot be threatened by a primary 
threat, its security value is always 80; and since it can never gain resources, it never 
has an incentive to admit or to expel a partner from an alliance. Countries 1 and 2, 
on the other hand, have a considerable incentive to ally with 3 .  
To  generalize our discussion to larger systems, we say that the partition P i s  stable 
if there is no alternative partition P' such that the security value of all members of C' 
in P' is greater than their security value in P. Formally, 
Definition: The partition P is stable if there does not exist a P' such that for 
any C' in P', st' > st for all i in C'.
A stable alliance system, then, looks like an element of the core of a cooperative 
game -- an outcome in which no coalition has the ability and a unanimous incentive 
to upset. An alliance partition is stable if no collection of countries has a unanimous 
positive incentive to establish a different partition. But unlike the usual applications 
of the core that presuppose the exogenous enforcement of agreements, alliances here 
are enforced by the mutual self-interest that arises from subsequently playing the 
threat-counter-threat game we use to model anarchic systems. 
4. Stable Alliance Systems: Existence
To characterize stable and unstable alliance systems, we offer the following general
theorem: Letting G(P) = ( i I st < r 0;) denote the set of countries with security values
less than their current resource distribution, then, 
Theorem 1: The alliance structure P is stable if and only if St G( P ). 
Theorem 1 by itself does not determine the stability of particular structures, 
because security values depend on the actions we ascribe to countries that are 
indifferent between abiding by and defection from an equilibrium strategy. For 
example, if r0 = ( 70,65,60, 55,50), if P = ({1,3 ,4), (2, 5)), and if 1, 3, and 4 abide by 
their equilibrium strategy, then, because ( 1,3,4} E C*, G(P) 
= (2, 5) -- that is, 
countries 2 and 5 can be the targets of a primary threat by (l,3,4). However, (2,4,5) 
and (2,3 ,5} also are in C*, and 3 and 4 are both indifferent as to which primary threat 
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they participate in. So if, in the case of indifference, countries have some probability 
of unilaterally defecting from an alliance's collective security arrangement, then 
everyone's security value in P is less then their current endowments. On the other 
hand, the partition ({3,4,5},{l ,2)) is immune from such instability because no 
individual defection from {3,4,5) yields an alternative coalition with a primary threat. 
Taking account of such uncertainty is important. In matters of survival, national 
leaders are unlikely to be comforted by technical arguments about equilibria and 
should plan for worst-case scenarios, which includes the defection of indifferent 
allies. Assuming, then, that indifferent countries "play with a shaky hand," Theorem 
2 provides our first specific result about stable alliances (Appendix A describes stable 
alliances if indifferent countries abide by equilibrium strategies with certainty): 
Theorem 2: If "countries play with a shaky hand," and if there are more than 
three essential countries, then P = (C,S-C) is stable if and only if: 
(I) S-C is empty; or 
( 2) C has a primary threat and for no i EC does S-C + { i) have a 
primary threat; or 
( 3) C hasn't a primary threat and for no i E S-C does C + (i) have 
a primary threat. 
Before illustrating this result, it is useful to distinguish between profitable and 
unprofitable alliances, because such a distinction removes some of the ambiguity 
between bipolar and multipolar systems and reveals that Theorem 2 applies to certain 
types of "multi-polar" systems. If r = ( 70,65,60, 55,50), then P 
= ((3,4,5},(l},(2)) and 
P' = ({3,4,5},{ 1,2)), in addition to being stable, are equivalent in the sense that it 
matters little whether 1 and 2 ally to transform P into the bipolar system P'. Allied 
or not, both countries are certain to be targets subsequently of a primary threat by 
{3,4,5}. Hence, to sort through these equivalences, we offer the following definition: 
Definition: Suppose Ak = {k,i, .. .,m} and Ak E P. If we substitute {k),(i), ... ,{m) 
for Ak in P to form P', then P and P' are equivalent if s/ = s/' < r/ for all j
E Ak, and if s/ = s/ ' for all other j ES. In this event Ak is unprofitable.
Thus, P = (C,A1, .. .Ak) is equivalent to (C,S-C) if S-C = A1u ... uAk is unprofitable. 
Letting Table 1 summarize our discussion, we now illustrate Theorems 1 and 2 
(Table 1 also summarizes the results in Appendix A). 
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Example: Let r0 = ( 120,80,60,40) and P = ({l ,2,3),(4)). Since (1 ,2,3) E C*, sl 
< r/. The only potential defectors from { l ,2,3) are 2 and 3, because neither
gains by threatening 4, but neither has an incentive to defect unilaterally since 
both can be punished. Hence, P is stable. Now let P = ((1 ,2),(3,4)), in which 
case 1 and 2 must each be concerned that its partner will defect since both 
(1 ,3,4) and (2,3,4) are advantaged. Thus, s{ <rt. j = 1 ,2 .  And although
neither 3 nor 4 has a positive incentive to defect, each is indifferent between 
maintaining the alliance and defecting, so if both play with a shaky hand, s{ 
<rt. j = 3,4. Hence, S = G(P), and from Theorem 1 ,  ((1 ,2),(3,4)) is unstable. 
For similar reasons, the partitions ((1 ,3),(2,4)) and ((1 ,4),(2,3)) are unstable. 
Example: If r0 = (70,65,60,55,50), then L = (1 ,2,3). Now consider P = 
({3,4,5), (1),(2)). Notice that {3,4,5) E C*, but no unilateral defection yields 
a coalition in C*. Thus, any defection can be punished and P is stable. In 
contrast, let P = ({ 1 ,4,5), (2,3} ). Although { 1 ,4,5) E C*, 4 and 5 can each 
unilaterally defect to (2,3) to form an advantaged coalition, which is a 
possibility we cannot preclude if countries play with a shaky hand whenever 
indifferent. Indeed, this argument applies to all bipolar systems in which one 
country has a primary threat except ( (3,4,5),{ l },{2}). Now let P = 
((1 ,2,3,4),(5)). If (1 ,2,3,4) proposes to eliminate 5, the result is a 4-country 
game in which no country is immune from being the target of a primary 
threat. But if 1 moves first in our threat-counter threat game and proposes 
that {1 ,4,5) threaten (2,3), 5 accepts, but 4 is indifferent between accepting 
and rejecting and so there is some probability that 4 rejects and 1 and 5 are 
targets of a subsequent threat. Thus, no threats are made and no one has an 
incentive to defect from their alliance, so P is stable. This situation reveals 
that not all states need agree to a collective security arrangement for that 
arrangement to yield the collective security outcome. 
Example: If r0 = ( 1 00,80,60,40,20), then L = (1 ,2), and 4-country coalitions 
against 1 ,  2 or 3 are advantaged as is { l ,2,3). And, since no unilateral 
defection from any of these coalitions generates a coalition with a competing 
alliance, the four alliance structures portrayed in Table 1 are stable. On the 
other hand, ((1 ,3,4), (2,5)) is not stable even though (1 ,3,4) E C*, because if 
3 defects, {2,3,5) has a primary threat. 
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Example: Let r0 = ( 1 00,80,20,20,20,20,20,20) .  Notice first that any (C,S-C) 
such that C E C* is stable, because no unilateral defection can generate a 
counter-coalition in C*. This example differs from our previous ones, 
however, in that previously, at least one alliance in the stable alliance structure 
is a winning coalition. In contrast, ((l },(2},(3,4,5,6,7,8)=L0) is stable here,
because no unilateral defection from L0 yields a coalition in C*. Because they
are never the recipients of a transfer, no i E L0 has no preference for a
different alliance system. For the same reason ((l ),(2},(3),(4,5,6,7,8)) is also 
stable. But if we delete too many from L0, as in P = ( (1 ),(2),(3),(4),(5,6,7,8)),
the alliance structure is unstable. First, the defection of anyone from (5,6, 7 ,8) 
renders (1 ,2,3,4,j) advantaged, so st< r/, j = 5,6,7,8. Second, (1 ,5,6,7,8) E
C*, so st< 'i 0, j = 2,3,4. Third, given their security values, countries 2,3, . . . ,8
have an incentive to threaten I (that such a threat exists follows from Lemma 
I), so s/ < r1°. The instability of P follows from Theorem I. Finally,
((1 ,2, . . .  ,7),(8)) and ((1 ,2, . . .  ,6),(7,8)) are stable for the same reason that 
(( 1 ,2,3,4),(5)) is stable in our first 5-country example and that each of these 
alliance systems yields the same outcome as an all-encompassing collective 
security arrangement -- the absence of any threat. 
Thus, using r0 = (75,65,60,55,50) to illustrate matters, the following conclusions 
summarize our results: 
I. not all winning or advantaged coalitions can establish a stable alliance 
structure - - ((1 ,2,3),(4),(5)) is not stable; 
2. the consequence of an all encompassing collective security system is
achieved by a collective security agreement that encompasses "nearly
all" states -- ((1 ,2,3,4),(5)) is stable and no country offers a threat in
the subsequent play of our threat-counter threat game;
3. stable alliance systems need not be bipolar -- ( (3,4,5),(1 ),(2)) is stable;
And, using r0 = ( 1 00,80,20, . . .  ,20) as our example, 
4. a stable alliance system need not contain any winning alliances --
( (1 ),(2),(3, . . .  ,8)) is stable.
To see these conclusions differently, notice that three types of alliances are the 
centerpiece of a stable alliance system: 
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A. an advantaged alliance such as (3,4,5) in ((1 ,2),(3,4,5)), which is 
thereby offensive; 
B.  a "large" alliance such as ((1 ,2,3, ... ,7),(8)) which supports a collective 
security outcome; and 
C. an alliance like (3,4, . . .  ,8) in ((1 ),(2),(3,4, . . .  ,8)), which is not winning 
and which is both defensive (because it can block any primary threat) 
and offensive (because it can join with others to form such a threat). 
Although our model cannot specify precisely the events following the formation 
of one type of alliance structure as against another, we can speculate. Briefly, type 
A alliances -- advantaged coalitions that can make primary threats -- are offensive. 
They are not formed to preserve any balance and they are likely to be short lived, 
because they are designed to upset the status quo in favor of a reallocation of 
resources. In contrast, type B alliance structures model the abortive League of Nations 
and more recently, perhaps, Bush's "New World Order." Historical evidence suggests 
that such alliances are short-lived as well, and indeed, we already know from Remark 
2 that they require a special form of "nurturing" if they are to compete against 
alliances of the first type. Finally, type C alliances are perhaps most congruent with 
classical balance of power notions in that they play the role of balancer and can either 
prevent profitable threats or determine which threat is eventually made and accepted. 
We cannot say, however, whether such alliances have any advantage over other types 
in terms of durability. 
5. Balancers
Alliances that can block the formation of a primary threat are necessarily pivotal 
between coalitions that can make such a threat. Although ((1 ),(4),(5),(2,3)) is stable 
if r0 = (I 00,80,60,40,20) and if countries play with a sure hand (see Appendix A), 
(2,3) can join with either 4 or 5 to form a profitable threat; and the alliance (3,4,5) 
plays a similar role in the structure ({l },(2),(3,4,5)). Thus, both (2,3) and {3,4,5) 
appear to satisfy the following definition of a balancer: 
Definition: a country or an alliance is a balancer in a given alliance structure 
if it is pivotal between any two coalitions of alliances with primary threats. 
The examples of Britain in the 1 9th century and China in the 20th, however, raise 
several questions. Owing ostensibly to its geographical isolation and its desire to 
preserve the status quo so as to maintain profitable trading relationships, Britain is 
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credited with playing the role of balancer in the 1 9th century, and thus we can ask: 
Does our analysis predict Britain's role and does it rationalize the relevance of 
geography. China in this century sought a similar role for itself, although, unlike 
Britain, it sought to form an alliance of third world states in order to offset the 
American and Soviet-led blocks. Thus we can ask: Why must China, as opposed to the 
US or USSR, play this role, and is there any reason to suppose that China would find 
a balancing alliance of third world states especially valuable? 
Looking at the issue of whether any country can be a balancer, given an 
appropriate partition, two remarks help us answer such a query. First, 
Remark 3: The two largest countries can never individually be balancers in any 
alliance structure. 
This remark appears to be contradicted by Britain's 1 9th century role. By most 
measures, Britain's military capability exceed that of any continental power despite 
the fact that Germany was closing fast at the end of the century. However, it is here 
that Britain's geographical position with respect to the continent becomes relevant. 
Although her navy ensured far greater force projection than Germany with respect 
to Africa, India, the Far East, and even, perhaps, the Balkans, the events of World 
War I confirm that Britain was severely handicapped in any military engagement close 
to Germany. Britain's potential on the continent as compared to Russia or France is 
less clear, but if we assume that one or the other exceeded Britain's continental 
capability, then Britain is no longer precluded from playing the role historians and 
diplomats assigned to her. Indeed, Remark 3 supplies a formal basis for rationalizing 
geography as an important determinant of that role. 
Whether Britain was uniquely positioned to play this role depends m part on 
whether the issue of Alsace-Lorraine precluded any effective Franco-German alliance 
and whether language and culture rendered Germany and Austria "natural" allies. If 
we simplify matters by ignoring Italy, if we assume that military capability on the 
continent was ordered G(ermany) +Austria> R(ussia) > B(ritain) > F(rance), and if 
we assume, for purposes of a specific numerical representation, that r0 = 
(120,80,60,40), then there are two offensive alliance structures: ((R,B,F),(G)) and 
((G,R,B),(F)), plus one "blocking" structure, ((G),(F),(R,B)). In all three instances, 
then, Britain and Russia pivot together. Although Russia sought the role of balancer, 
it attempted to play this role using one alliance that was not winning -- (R,F) -- and 
one that was winning but not advantaged -- (G,R). In addition, its efforts were 
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hampered by its ineptitude and perceived perfidity -- certainly, Britain's leaders 
played their role with considerably greater skill. 
However, more problematical from the perspective of asserting that Britain's role 
was preordained, is this result: 
Remark 4: lf the number of essential countries equals three, then the smallest 
state is a balancer; but if the number of such countries exceeds three, then no 
individual country can be a balancer in any stable alliance structure. 
Reassessing Britain's role, recall that the period 1870 - 1914 was marked by 
considerable alliance instability. The short life of the League of Three Emperors, the 
formation of the Triple Alliance, Germany's courting of Britain, Russia's vacillation 
between alliance with Germany and alliance with France, British overtures to Austria, 
and Italy's uncertain role contrast sharply with 40+ years of stability exhibited by 
NA TO and the Warsaw Pact. Thus, although Britain may have been assisted in its role 
of balancer by geography, playing that role unilaterally also required a fluidity of 
alignments that disappeared when Germany threatened continental predominance. 
In contrast, Remark 4 suggests that to the extent that it perceived a 3-state system 
dominated by America and the USSR, China alone could seek to play the role of 
balancer. To the extent, though, that other states become relevant and potentially 
independent actors, China cannot play that role alone and to extract resources from 
a stable international system, intermediate states must forge an alliance with smaller 
states. Admittedly, though, the balancing role we have outlined for the states in L0
is not altogether supported by historical evidence. As Fox ( 1959:185) observes 
"attempts to add to the power of the small states by combining with other small and 
presumably disinterested small states regularly failed .. ." On the other hand, Fox also 
reveals that a balancing role was not precluded as a possibility: "none of the small 
states . . .  dared go so far in using the strength of one side to oppose another . . .  [but] the 
possibility of such a move was frequently in the minds of the great-power leaders." 
6. Conclusions
The preceding discussion does not explain why countries seek the role of balancer, 
which points to one of the limitations of our analysis. For Britain, as an industrialized 
trading state with significant overseas investments whose benefits came from 
maintaining the status quo of loosely formed alliances, the implementation of a threat 
jeopardized economic gains. Thus, Britain may have preferred a system in which no 
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stable, threatening alliance formed. In contrast, China, as a consumer of technology 
and investment, sought to extract the benefits that arose when competing alliances felt 
compelled to bid for her "services." However, neither the gains sought by Britain nor 
the transfers sought by China are part of our model. 
Our model also fails to consider the process whereby alliances form and dissolve, 
and focuses instead on the outcomes that end bargaining. But if we accept Claude's 
( 1 962:145) view that in balance of power politics the system "divides [countries] into 
antagonistic groups, jockeying for position against each other," then such politics 
concerns process rather than final outcomes, and we cannot be certain that we have 
not bypassed the part of international affairs that occupies the greatest share of the 
diplomat's time. Indeed, our evaluation of Britain's role in the 1 9th century rests on 
the presumption that this period did not correspond to an equilibrium outcome, but 
rather to an period in which one country (Britain) deliberately sought to forestall any 
ultimate resolution of bargaining. The suggestion here, then, is that the next step in 
modeling anarchic systems is a model that pays special attention to the bargaining 
process whereby alliances are negotiated. 
There are other matters that we have ignored. First, we do not allow countries to 
invest resources so that relative resource shares (power) change over time. Second, 
aside from the assumption that countries prefer to have resources ceded to them over 
securing them by implementing threats, we do not fully accommodated the costs of 
war. A final matter to be confronted is that of uncertainty. Although we allow 
indifferent countries to choose probabilistically, this is not the only way in which 
uncertainty can effect our analysis. A second and perhaps more important way is 
bypassed by our assumption that every state knows the point at which a state becomes 
predominant. Hence, there is no risk to allowing a state to become near-predominant, 
which is not an assumption that we can comfortably assert characterizes reality. 
Despite these limitations we can provide conclusions that are more powerful than 
those offered by previous research. First, once the issue of exogenous enforcement 
is confronted, hypotheses such as the size principle must be modified -- indeed, stable 
alliance structures need not even contain winning alliances. Second, the realization 
of a universal collective security arrangement does not require the acquiescence of all 
states. Something other than a coalition-of-the-whole can enforce such an 
equilibrium if states fear the uncertainty that prevails after excluded states are 
"eliminated." Only systems in which states suffer the hubris of believing that they can 
enforce something that was unenforceable before they took aggressive action requires 
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an all-encompassing agreement to ensure a threat-free international system. Third, 
although alliances can be both offensive and balancing, balancing alliances are most 
easily formed by collections of smaller states that cannot aspire to near-predominance. 
Thus, our analysis is consistent with the hypothesis that there is a fundamental 
divergence in the foreign policy objectives of "small" versus "large" states. In 
summary, there is a great variety of stable alliance systems. In particular, we can 
conjecture that there is no necessity for choosing between the "state of nature of pure 
balance of power" and the seemingly unrealizable utopia of an all encompassing 
collective security system. 
Our final conclusion concerns the tendency of alliance systems to move towards 
bipolarity. Our approach has been to identify systems that have core-like stability in 
the sense that there are not countries with a positive incentive to reform a preexisting 
system prior to the play of our threat-counter-threat game. Thus, in looking at the 
process whereby alliances "build up" from some initial state of nature, we cannot say 
whether we are more .likely to move towards competing alliances, blocking alliances, 
or "large" alliances that ensure the collective security outcome. On the other hand, 
notice that even a stable partition such as ({I },(2},(3},(4,5}) can eventually result in 
bipolarity. Countries 4 and 5 are indifferent between blocking any profitable threat 
and eventually forming such a threat with 1, 2, or 3, and in fact making either choice 
is an equilibrium choice. Thus, whether or not a system eventually results in 
bipolarity (in the form of a primary threat by C against S-C) in the play of our 
threat-counter threat game depends on factors that we do not fully consider such as 
the costs of conflict. If there are mechanisms whereby 4 and 5 are assured of sharing 
in the spoils of "victory," and if conflict is not too costly, then bipolarity results; but 
if there are no such mechanisms or if conflict destroys any potential gains from 
implementing threats, then the eventual outcome is indeterminate. Any tendency 
towards bipolarity, then, must originate from considerations in addition to the desire 
of nations to survive in anarchic environments. 
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Table I: Stable Alliance Structures with profitable alliances 
ro with "shaky hand" without "shaky hand" 
( 1 20 , 1 00,80) ((1 ,3},{2}) same as with shaky hand 
((2,3},{I}) + 
({l },{2},{3}) ({ 1 ,2,3}) 
( 1 20,80,60,40) ({I ,2,3,4}) same as with shaky hand 
({l ,2,3},{4}) + 
({1 ,2 ,4},{3}) ({l },{2},(3,4}) 
({l ,3,4},{2}) ({l },{3},{2,4}) 
({2,3,4},{I}) ({l },{4},(2,3}) 
(70,65,60,55,50) ({ 1 ,2,3,4,5}) same as with shaky hand 
({3 ,4,5), {I},  (2}) + 
({I ,2,3,4},{5}) ( { 1 ,4,5} '{2} '{3})
({l ,2,3,5},{4}) ( {2,4,5} ,{I}, {3}) 
( (1 ,2,4,5},{3}) ( { 1 ,3,4}' {2} ' { 5})
((1 ,3,4,5},{2}) ({ 1 ,3,5},{2},{ 4}) 
((2,3,4,5},{I}) ({2,3,5},{ I},{ 4 }) 
({ 1 },{2},{3 },{ 4,5)) 
( 1 00,80,60,40,20) ({ 1 ,2,3,4,5}) same as with shaky hand 
({1 ,3,4,5),(2}) + 
({2,3,4,5),{ l})  ( { 1 , 3,4}' {2} ' { 5}) 
({l ,2,4,5},(3}) ({I ,3,5),{2},{  4}) 
({ 1 ,2,3 },{ 4},{5}) ( {2,3 ,4}, {I},  { 5)) 
({2,3,5},{ 1 },(4}) 
( ( 1 } ,  (2} ,  {3 ,4,5}) 
({ 1 },(4 },{5),(2,3}) 
Appendix A 
If indifferent countries "play with a sure hand" and always make equilibrium choices, 
then the set of stable alliance structures necessarily expands and ascertaining the extent 
of this expansion allows us to evaluate the effect of the form of uncertainty that our 
analysis admits. Our central result in this circumstance is this: 
Theorem 3: If countries defect from alliances only if they gain from doing so. 
then any bipolar alliance system is stable. 
This result appears to admit too much, but recall the three types of stable systems 
identified previously. For example, if r0 = (70,65,60,55,50), then P = ({l ,2,4),{3,5)), P' 
= ({ 1 ,2,3,4 },(5}), and P" = (( 1 ,2,3},( 4,5)) are stable. In P the alliance ( 1 ,2,4} has a primary 
threat, P' is equivalent to an all encompassing collective security arrangement, and P" 
establishes (3,4} as a potential blocking alliance. Thus, if we again ignore unprofitable 
alliances, P illustrates Remark 5, P' illustrates Remark 6, and P" illustrates Remark 7: 
Remark 5: If countries defect from alliances only if they gain from doing so, then 
any alliance system in which one alliance has a primary threat is stable. 
Remark 6: If countries defect from alliances only if they gain from doing so. and 
if alliances must be renegotiated after any reallocation of resources, then the 
bipolar alliance system (C.S-C) is stable and is equivalent to an all-encompassing 
collective security arrangement if r(S-C) + rmax[C] < R/2.
Remark 7: As long the members of S - A, r( S-A) > r( A) and A E P, require some 
member of A to form a primary threat, then P is stable. 
These remarks do not imply that the only interesting non-bipolar stable alliances 
structures are those that entail coalitions of countries in L0, or that only the smallest 
countries can form defensive alliances. Our next theorem allows us to establish 
circumstances under which other types of alliance systems are stable, including systems 
in which members of L join a defensive alliance. 
Theorem 4: If countries defect from alliances only if they gain from doing so. 
then P is stable if there is a C § P such that there does not exist a K i;; S-C in 
which K s  c• and for no i s  C is (i} + K s  c• with i = max[K,i]. 
Example: If r0 = (70,65,60,50,30, 7,6,6,6), then L0 = (4,5,6, 7,8,9}, and from
Remark 6, (( I ),{2},(3 ),{ 4,5,6, 7,8,9)) is stable. But let P = ({ 1 ,6, 7),{2,8,9),{3,4,5) ) . 
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Because no combination of 1 ,  2, 6, 7 ,  8 ,  and 9 is advantaged, (3,4,5} cannot be 
threatened and it has no incentive to accept another country into it. Hence, 
(3,4,5} is a purely defensive alliance, and P is stable. 
Example: If r0 = ( 1 00,80,60,40,20), then L
0 
= {3,4,5), and, from Remark 6 ,
({l) ,(2), (3,4,5)) is  stable. But if  P = ({l },{4},(2,3),{5}), then (2,3) cannot be 
threatened by a primary threat -- indeed, as long as (2,3} maintains itself, only 
(2,3,5} and (2,3,4) are advantaged. However, (2,3) is not purely defensive since 
it can join other countries to form an advantaged coalition. 
Thus, if countries play with a sure hand, we can observe blocking alliances that 
include members of L - - (2,3} when r0 = ( 1 00,80,60,40,20) and (3,4,5) when r0 = 
(70,65,60,50,30, 7,6,6,6). But the stability of such alliances rests on a precarious 
assumption, and although "great powers" (those in L) might try to construct an alliance 
that blocks threats, they are likely to be thwarted by any uncertainty of commitment. 
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Appendix B: Proofs 
Proof of Lemma 1 :  The lemma is clearly true V k E L  since ILi :?:. 2 and since, for 
any k E L, 3 C E  C* that excludes k, namely C = L0 + (j}, j f. k, j E L.  For any j E 
L0, if ri + r1 � R/2, then clearly S-{i} E C*. So suppose ri + r1 < R/2. Then construct
the coalition C' by adding members of S-(j} to j, beginning with the largest (country 
I ), then the next largest, and so on to m+ I ,  until r( C') + rm :?:. R/2. Then S-C' E C* -
- by construction, condition i is satisfied; condition ii cannot be violated since r1 + ri 
< R/2 implies that rm + r< R/2; and condition iii cannot be violated since I rfc S-C'. 
We proceed now to establish three additional lemmas. 
Lemma 2: If C $ C* because condition iii is violated, then both S-C + 
{max[C]) and S-C + K are advantaged, where K � C - {max[C]). 
Proof: That S-C+{max[C]) E C* follows from the assumption that condition iii is 
violated. Next, notice that r(C-{max[C]))  + r(S-C) > R/2, otherwise max[C] > R/2. 
So add members from C-{max[C]) to S-C, beginning with the smallest members of C­
{max[CJ), until the resulting coalition is winning. This coalition is advantaged - ­
neither condition ii nor iii can be violated. 
Lemma 3: If C $ C* because condition ii is violated, then 3 j E C, j f. max[C], 
such that S-C+(j} E C*, with j = max[S-C + (j}]. 
Proof: If condition ii is violated, then 3 j f. max[C] in C such that S-C + (j} E W. Let 
j be the smallest country in C for which this is true. S-C + (j} rfc C* either because 
it fails to satisfy condition ii or iii. It cannot violate condition ii, though, since ti C' 
E W that excludes S-C, has j as its largest member, and is advantaged. Nor can 
condition iii be violated; otherwise, C-{max[C],j} + {h} E W, where h f. max[S-C]. 
However, S-C + (j} E W by construction, so C-(j} and C - {max[C],j} rfc W. And since 
r0 max!S-C) < rt by construction, C - {max[C],j) + {h} $ W.
Lemma 4: If all i E S  are essential and r max!CJ + r(S-C) < R/2, then ICJ � 4 .
Proof: The lemma is  clearly true if ISi = 4, otherwise country 4 is  inessential. By 
the same token, if ISi :?:. 5 and if r maxi CJ + r(S-C) < R/2, then IC! � 4; otherwise,
members of S-C are inessential. 
Proof of Theorem 1: To prove sufficiency, notice first that if G(P) = 0, then no 
i E L0 gains by defecting to some other alliance or by admitting someone to their 
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alliance. Since threats in which members of L gain require the participation of
members of £ 0 , P is stable. Second, suppose that G(P) * ¢ and that S * G(P). Thus, 
j E G(P) can improve its security value if G' k G(P) is advantaged or if G' can form 
an advantaged coalition with i E S-G(P) such that i = max[G' ,i]. But then st < ri 0 for 
j E S  - G(P) - {i}, which is a contradiction. To prove necessity, we must show that 
if S = G(P), then P is not stable, which follows from the fact that in this instance, 
every country can improve its security value by reforming P so that it is the member 
of an alliance with a primary threat. 
Proof of Theorem 2: We already know that an all-encompassing collective security 
system is stable (Result 2). So suppose S-C is not empty. 
(Sufficiency, part 2): To see that no i E C  has an incentive to defect in the threat­
counter-threat game, suppose i switches from C to S-C to form P' = (C-{i),S-C+{i}). 
If r(C-(i)) ?:. r(S-C+{i)), then since i may tremble back to C-{i}, st' < ri0 V j E S-C. 
And by Lemmas 2 and 3, st' < r/ V j E C-(j}. So V j E S-{i}, st' < r{ By Lemma 
1 ,  3 C' E C* with i rf. C', so st' < r( Thus, i will not defect. Alternatively, if r(C-{i)) 
< r(S-C+{i)), then given the conditions of the Theorem, S-C+{i} ff. C*, and by Lemmas 
2 and 3, sr < ri0 V i E S-C+{i}. Thus, i does not defect from C.
(Sufficiency, part 3): Suppose C ff. C*. We have two cases. First. if r(S-C) + 
r max[ CJ ?:. R/2, then C ff. C* because condition ii or iii is violated. Lemma 2 implies
that all j E C are vulnerable to a primary threat. Lemma 3 implies that all members 
of C-{j}, j * max[C], are vulnerable to a primary threat -- but then j is vulnerable 
as well since S-C + {max[C]) E C*. Hence, st < r/ V j E C. Since, by the assumption 
of the theorem, C + {i} ff. C* V i  E S-C, any defection from S-C can be punished and 
no i E S-C has an incentive to defect. Hence, si 0 = ri 0 V i E S-C. By theorem 1 ,
(C,S-C) is stable. Alternatively, let r(S-C) + rmax[CJ < R/2, so unilateral defection
from C can form an advantaged coalition with S-C. After the elimination of S-C, by 
Lemmas 4 and I ,  everyone is the target of some primary threat if alliances are 
renegotiated. Thus, P is stable (by Theorem 1 ) . 
(Necessity, part 2): If C E  C*, then st < r/ V j E S-C. However, if there is an i 
E C  such that S-C u {i} E C*, then by the "shaky hand assumption," st < r/ V C - {i}, 
in which case all members of C - {i} are willing to join a primary threat against i in 
the play of our threat-counter threat game. And since i can be threatened by a 
primary threat (Lemma I ), st < rt, so P is not stable (by Theorem I ). 
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(Necessity, part 3): If C � C* but if 3 i E S-C such that i can form an advantaged 
coalition with C, then if there is some probability that i will join in a primary threat 
against S-C-{i) whenever i is indifferent, s/ < ri0 'r/ j E S-C-{i}. So as before, s/ <
r/ 'r/ j E S-{i}, in which case 3 C E  C* such that i � C (Lemma I) and P is unstable
(by Theorem I). 
Proof of Remark 3: Country I cannot be a balancer, otherwise, condition iii is 
violated. But if we attempt to make 2 a balancer, then condition ii is violated. 
Proof of Remark 4: Let P = (A1,A2,(j}), where A1 + (j}, A2 + (j) E C*. Then s/ < rj0
'r/ j E A1 and A2, in which case, from Lemma 1 ,  s/ < rt 'r/ j, and from Theorem I ,  P
is unstable. 
Proof of Remark 5: If C E  P and C E  C*, then for no i E C  and K \;; S-C is K + {i} E 
C* and i = max[K + {i}]. So no i E C has a positive incentive to defect, and s;p = r0 'r/
i E C. By Theorem I, P is stable. 
Proof of Remark 6: Members of C have two choices: eliminate or not eliminate S-C. 
If C eliminates S-C, then since alliances must be renegotiated, by Lemma 1 ,  s/ < ri0
'r/ j E C in the new system provided that IQ 2:. 4 (since from Remark 2, every i � C' 
for some C' E C*), which is what Lemma 4 establishes. If C does not eliminate S-C, 
then since no i E C  can form an advantaged coalition with members of S-C, st = r0
'r/ i E C. By Theorem 1 ,  P is stable. 
Proof of Remark 7: No subset of S-A can coalesce to form an advantaged coalition, 
so the members of A cannot be threatened with a primary threat. Clearly now, no i 
E A n L0• For i E A n L, if i is the largest country in the newly formed advantaged 
coalition, then r(A-{i}) + ri > R/2, which contradicts the assumption that r(S-A) > r A" 
Proof of Theorem 3: Let P = (C,S-C). If C E  C*, then Remark 5 establishes that P 
is stable. If C � C*, but if r(S-C) + rmax[CJ > R/2, then Remark 7 establishes that P
is stable. And if r(S-C) + r max[CJ > R/2, then P's stability follows from Remark 6.
Proof of Theorem 4: A direct corollary of Theorem l .  
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Footnotes 
1 .  Our results require four assumptions, the last of which pertains to the payoffs 
we associate with alternative outcomes. First, a near-predominant country can 
take advantage of conflicts among other countries to become predominant. 
Hence, outcomes in which one country is near-predominant are terminal since 
no one makes a new threat for fear that the near-predominant country will 
become predominant. Second, if i can become near-predominant by 
implementing a threat or by a resource transfer, i prefers the transfer. So if 
i = max[C], then the system is frozen if S-C offers to render i near­
predominant. Clearly, if S-C prefers freezing the system, it should transfer 
to i, since this choice minimizes the resources that it must surrender, and i 
accepts the offer, because R/2 is i's most preferred feasible outcome. Third, 
when countering a threat and whenever it is possible to do so, i chooses a 
counter that includes all jointly threatened countries in the newly proposed 
coalition (with the rationale that the threat against S-C makes the formation 
of S-C less costly). Finally, in the case of terminal nodes (when some country 
is near-predominant), the payoff to country i, ui(r), equals ri. For non­
terminal nodes, rather than becoming concerned with complex expected value 
calculations, assume that countries are risk-averse in this sense: if R(r) is the 
set of terminal and non-terminal resource distributions that might be reached 
from r, given the assumed strategies of the players, then ui(r) = min[Rj(r)].,
2. Although the alternative "countries make or participate in threats only if doing
so promises them a gain" yields an equilibrium, this equilibrium is unstable in
that countries have an incentive to defect if there is any chance that others
will defect. That is, the equilibrium is not perfect.
3. The actual formal statement of this condition is: For no C E C* is there a
winning coalition C' such that C n C' = { 1 }  and r( C') > r( C); 
4. Notice that the threat ( 1 50,0,80,70) by { l ,3,4} is, like ( 1 50,0,75,75), also a
primary threat. But if two threats by the same coalition satisfy our
requirements, then those threats are strategically equivalent.
5 .  Recalling that the subscript i on ri orders the countries from largest to
smallest, L0 consists of countries n, n- 1 ,  .. . ,  k, such that L0 is losing but L0
plus country k- 1 (the next largest country) is winning. In 3-country systems,
L0 is always the smallest country.
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